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Martin: The Constitution and Legislative Jurisdiction

THE CONSTITUTION AND LEGISLATIVE
JURISDICTION
James A. Martin*

Commentators have been struggling for years to flesh out the
limits of a state's power to apply its law to private disputes-its legislative jurisdiction.1 Often the results of their labors are stated in
terms of such generality as to provide little guidance for deciding
actual cases.2 Even when the suggested limits on legislative jurisdiction are stated in much greater detail,3 one is left with the unsatisfactory feeling that those details are more the result of an attempt to
accommodate a variety of case law than the result of basic principles. The field of legislative jurisdiction is noted for sporadic,4 uncoordinated 5 efforts on the part of the Supreme Court.
Perhaps one of the most widely accepted formulas, though extremely general, is Professor Weintraub's statement that the states
are forbidden to apply their own law when to do so would constitute
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.S. 1965, University of Illinois; M.S. 1966,
J.D. 1969, University of Michigan.

1. Although some commentators disapprove the term "legislative jurisdiction," I find it
less cumbersome than any other term that seems its equivalent, such as "constitutional limitations on choice of law." It includes, of course, the outer limits on the appropriate scope of a
state's common law as well as statutory law. See R. LEFLAR, AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 55,
at 105 (3d ed. 1977).

2. R.

LEFLAR,

supra note 1, § 60, at 117-18.

3.

See, e.g., Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit in Choice of
Law, 62 CORNELL L. REv. 94, 102-04, 119-20 (1976).

4. Seventeen years passed between Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S. 179 (1964)
and Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981).
5. Professor Crosskey states:
[I]n general, it may be said that, whereas a single uniform system of nation-wide
rules of the interstate conflict of laws is what was intended; what we actually have
today is [fifty] different systems, varying unimportantly, but very troublesomely,
from state to state, with the Supreme Court's system of largely unpredictable interferences, in the name, sometimes, of "full Faith -and Credit" and, sometimes, of
"due process of law," superimposed on top of these. And the result, as might be
expected, is a vast chaos of complexity and uncertainty, instead of the simple nation-wide system for which the Constitution provided and still provides.
W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 555
(1953).
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unfair surprise;6 but there are many problems with adopting unfair
surprise as the sole criterion for constitutional limits on legislative
jurisdiction. First, from a strictly logical point of view, surprise is an
irrelevancy in a legal system that charges litigants with knowledge of
the law - including the law of choice of law. Nonetheless, there is
an element of factual surprise - failure to anticipate events that
would connect a dispute with a particular state such as a change of
domicile by one of the parties, or failure to anticipate jurisdiction
being exercised by a given forum with an inclination toward applying its own law. When the surprise is understandable enough, and
when taking advantage of the changed circumstances to apply unanticipated law would upset the reasonable planning of the parties,
there is surely an inclination to label the assertion of legislative
juris7
process.
due
of
violation
a'
hence
and
diction as unfair
Yet unfair surprise is not the only element of appropriate limitations on state legislative jurisdiction. Take, for example, a tort case
in which the forum, having virtually no significant contacts with the
case, applies its own law. Surely the evil in this act is not unfair
surprise, genuine though the feelings of surprise may be, because the
essence of unfair surprise is the disruption of planned affairs. Since
the tort was unplanned, there can be no such disruption. Or, to put it
another way, warning the parties in advance that a given law would
be applied would not have changed their behavior; thus, surprise is
immaterial to the wrong they suffer. 8 In limits on legislative jurisdic6. R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 9.2A, at 505 (2d ed.
1980).
7. This assertion is a partial recantation of an earlier assertion I made in Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 185 (1976). In that article I
argued that unfairness was not an element of inappropriate choice of law. In the text ubove I
concede that unfair surprise may be a violation of due process, but as the text below will
indicate, I still believe that unfairness per se is not a useful characterization for violations of a
state's legislative jurisdiction except in the relatively rare cases of surprise.
8. There are cases in which a sufficiently large enterprise may modify a product design,
for example, in response to tort law. Such cases, however, do not explain the reaction of unfairness when individual litigants are involved.
Also, Professor Weintraub has noted that even in the leading case of Home Insurance Co.
v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397 (1930), which is often taken as a case illustrating unfair surprise, the
surprise may not have been as great as first appears. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, § 9.2A, at
502-03. In Dick the insurance contract has been assigned to Dick, a Texan resident in Mexico.
The original insured was a Mexican company. 281 U.S. at 403. Thus, the surprise of applying
Texas law on the basis of an assignee's citizenship seemed acute. But, as Professor Weintraub
observed from an inspection of the record in the case, Dick was named as a possible assignee
in the original insurance contract. R. WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, § 9.2A, at 502-03. Professor
Redish notes Weintraub's discovery but adds the possibility that the Court's failure to refer to
the assignment clause may indicate that it assumed Dick to be an unfair surprise case. Redish,
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tion, therefore, there is clearly a concept of unfairness that is not
causally related to party expectations.
This concept might lead to a formula that substitutes simple
fairness for unfair surprise: A state may not apply its own law to a
private dispute when to do so would be unfair. But like Malory's
advice to do after the good and leave the evil,9 the rule states goals
that are unimpeachable while providing guidance that is inscrutable.
We need to know more about why a particular act of overreaching
by a state, even absent planning or surprise, can convey such an unmistakable impression of unfairness that it invites condemnation
under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 10
One peculiar characteristic of this unfairness, as I have pointed
out elsewhere,1 is that it is not the garden variety of unfairness dealt
with under the due process clause. Consider, for example, the statute
that Texas attempted to apply in Home Insurance Co. v. Dick. 2 The
statute was one that invalidated contract clauses if those clauses limited the time for suing under the contract to a period of two years or
less. 3 There is nothing prima facie unfair about such a statute, and
certainly nothing in the Dick opinion suggests otherwise. But, much
more important for present purposes, there was nothing unfair-in
the ordinary sense-in applying such a provision to a contract that
has no connection with the State of Texas. If Texas believes in the
principle that no one's right to sue should be cut off too early, there
is nothing in such a principle that restricts it to contracts formed in
Texas, involving Texas citizens, to be performed in Texas, or the
like. The issue is not one of reliance 14 or of different ways of looking
at things in different cultures. The point is that the Texas legislature,
presumably after considering the value of freedom of contract and
Due Process,Federalism, and PersonalJurisdiction:A TheoreticalEvaluation, 75 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1112, 1127-28 (1981).

9. This moral was attributed to Malory's famous romance by his publisher William
Caxton. For the original text see Caxton, Prefaceto T. MALORY, MORTE DARTHUR (W. Caxton ed. 1485), in I THE WORKS OF SIR THOMAS MALORY cxlvi (2d ed. E. Vinaver 1967).
10. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
11. Martin, supra note 7, at 188-91.
12. 281 U.S. 397 (1930).
13. Id. at 404-05.
14. It is conceivable that in the Dick case there was either a statistical reliance before
the fact (i.e., limiting the period for suing will, statistically, reduce the number of over-all
suits) or after the fact (investing assets in a nonliquid manner after a year has passed rather
than keeping them liquid in anticipation of a claim), but it is unlikely. Moreover, so long as
there are cases in which reliance was not present, as there certainly must be, and so long as the
result would be the same in those cases, as it certainly would be, the reliance is obviously not
critical. See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
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whatever else was relevant, determined that it was wrong to deprive
a litigant of his right to a decent time in which to decide whether or
not to sue, and invalidating clauses that said otherwise was a matter
of simple fairness. It seems ironic to label as unfair the application
of a statute whose goal is simple fairness and which has no inherent
geographical orientation.
None of this is to say that Texas behaved properly, or that Dick
was wrongly decided. While there are reasons for denying application of the Texas statute, they do not arise from some relationship
between the State of Texas and the individual litigants. They arise,
rather, because Texas applied its own law to a case in which it had
insufficient interest to justify the imposition of its own brand of fairness;15 and it did so at the expense of the ideas of fairness to another
sovereign, Mexico, which had an overwhelmingly better claim to regulate the transaction.16
We could explain the intuitive feelings of unfairness concerning
Texas' actions in the Dick case by asserting that Texas was being
unfair to Mexico. A much more plausible explanation for the sense
of unfairness, however, lies in the recollection that it is persons, not
states, who are generally involved in litigation, and they have a right
to complain that they are being treated unfairly if they are made to
suffer as a result of the forum's failure to follow its legal duty to
other sovereigns. In other words, the type of unfairness (arid thus
violation of due process) found in Dick is derivative, flowing from
Texas' violation of an independent duty owed to Mexico. 17
The source of this duty is found in the full faith and credit
clause 118a clause specifically designed to allow federal regulation
of various relationships between the quasi-sovereign states.19 Although there may appear to be problems in finding within the text of
that clause authority for requiring some deference to the common
law of another state, as well as to its statutory law (since the clause
15.

281 U.S. at 408-09.

16. Id. at 408.
17.

Thus there are two possible types of violation of due process in these cases: the direct

type arising from unfair surprise and the indirect or derivative type which relies for its existence on an independent constitutional violation and hence need not be analyzed in terms of
due process.

18. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1.
19. Professor Crosskey refers to the application of due process to the conflict-of-laws
question as the Supreme Court's "fanciful modern theory of 'due process of law.'" W. CRossKEY, supra note 5, at 555. Crosskey argues that the full faith and credit clause was meant not
only to be the only important limitation on state choice-of-law theories, but also to prescribe
choice-of-law rules for the states. Id. at 553-55.
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refers to the "public Acts" of the states), Professor Crosskey has
convincingly demonstrated that the term "Records" used in the
clause refers to the judicial decisions of the states, i.e., their common

law.20 A further problem arises because the clause requires granting
full faith and credit only to the laws of other "States"; thus the utility of a due process approach in such cases as Dick, where the other
sovereign is a country and not a state of the United States, is obvious. Nonetheless, it is not difficult to develop a theory of federal
common law, patterned on the law of full faith and credit among the
states, and justified by the supremacy clause and the power of the
federal government to regulate foreign relations, in order to fill that
21
gap.

Professor Redish has recently taken an approach in the area of
judicial jurisdiction similar to this general approach to legislative ju20. Id. If a purely historical argument is deemed insufficient, a convincing argument can
be made that the regulation of state choice of law is "inherently federal." This is so because
the states are hardly in a position to be fair arbitrators of whether or not they have overstepped the bounds of their authority with respect to other states. Professor Redish cautions
against finding "implicit" federal powers of this general sort in the Constitution:
[W]hile the Court may necessarily exercise considerable freedom in defining and
applying constitutional language, it does not follow that it can supplement the specific provisions of the Constitution by writing new ones, rather than interpreting
existing ones. For, if recognized, such a power knows no logical bounds: if the
Court's constitutional pronouncements are not required to have at least an arguable
basis in the document's language, the Court's decisions inescapably become mere
fiat, insulated from reasoned debate other than in the purely legislative sense of
debating the normative wisdom of whatever "constitutional" rule the Court is considering devising.
Redish, supra note 8, at 1130. Although these words may represent wise cautions against
general judicial constitution-drafting, there are reasons not to be so concerned in the present
context. First, the command of full faith and credit to the acts of another state would provide
virtually absolute guidance for the content of a rule commanding full faith and credit to the
common law of another state. Thus there would indeed be "logical bounds" to the process, and
rather severe ones at that. Second, the Court has chosen such a path in at least one other
context with less basis for choosing the substantive rules. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961), the Court ruled that one state may not escheat funds supposedly held by the Western Union Company within its borders, unless it could provide reasonable assurance that another state would not attempt to escheat the same funds by applying a
different theory as to where the intangible funds were located. Id. at 80. Since no state could
require another to defend in its own courts (absent special circumstances like those in Nevada
v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410 (1979)), in order to resolve the location of the funds authoritatively
between the contending states, the issue appeared to be at an impasse. The Supreme Court
solved the problem, however, by laying down a substantive rule of law, without any textual
basis in the Constitution, for resolving such escheat questions between the states. 368 U.S. at
77-80. Thus, even though Nevada v. Hall demonstrates that not all invitations to discover a
federal refereeing function in the framework of the Constitution will be honored, some have,
and have been successful.
21. For such an argument, see Martin, supra note 7, at 196-200.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

5

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:133

risdiction.22 He notes that there are two main elements in current
due process analysis of state judicial jurisdiction-fairness and federalism. He asserts that, despite the apparent emphasis on fairness in
the leading case of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,2" federalism has played the dominant role.24 The federalism that he discusses
seems to be identical with the concern for state sovereignty that I
some
have already discussed, and I hereby adopt the term, despite
25
difficulties that might ensue from taking it too literally.
Perhaps Redish's most striking and original observation is the
lack of authority for finding any element of federalism in the idea of
due process.2" The concept of due process certainly existed in England, yet obviously the states (or other similar quasi-sovereign entities) did not exist in the English system. Thus, whatever element of
federalism due process may have absorbed clearly did not come from
England but from American judicial interpretations of the text of
the Constitution. Redish convincingly demonstrates that "the infusion of federalism into a due process analysis" 27 occurred unsupported by history or precedent in Pennoyer v. Neff.28 One of Professor Redish's conclusions is, quite simply, that the due process clause
was intended to regulate the relationship between the individual and
the sovereign, while constitutional restrictions based upon ideas of
federalism must necessarily spring from other sources,29 chiefly the
full faith and credit clause.
At one time, numbed by months of wrestling with these elusive
concepts and the rigors of responding to an excellent and and scholarly criticism of my thoughts,"° I wrote: "What difference does it
make which [constitutional clause] guides the exercise of state power
in conflicts cases? In a sense it does not matter. The argument is as
idle as the infamous dispute on the terpsichorean talents of angels." 3' Even at the time that statement was made it was hyperbolic
in light of remarks that followed it, but because it has been given
22:
23.

Redish, supra note 8.
326 U.S. 310 (1945).

24.

Redish, supra note 8, at 1117-18.

25.

I emphasize that I wish to embrace deference to the laws of other countries as well

as other states. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
26. Redish, supra note 8, at 1114.
27. Id. at 1124.
28. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).

29. Redish, supra note 8, at 1129.
30. Kirgis, supra note 3.
31.

Martin, A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 151, 153 (1976).
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some prominence elsewhere, 2 I hereby publicly recant it. Professor
Redish has noted, 33 as I once did much more briefly, 34 that no other
aspect of the sprawling subject of due process contains any notions of
federalism.3 5 The single dominant theme of due process is the relationship between the individual and the sovereign. Thus, due process analysis in the choice-of-law area ought to be limited to cases
involving that relationship--the relatively small number of cases
containing an element of genuine unfair surprise. The remaining
cases ought to be analyzed under full faith and credit, with its emphasis on federalism.
Identifying the dominant theme, however, is not the equivalent
of uneafthing a treasure trove of readymade constitutional rules.
Among the broad choices that could be made in this area, however,
is to impose rules that would purport, at least in theory, to choose
the law of one and only one state for all occasions, as a matter of
constitutional law.37 At one time it appeared that the Supreme Court
was headed in that direction, but it soon turned to the second
choice-a system of limitations rather than proscription. 8 Thus
there are many cases, and issues in cases, which could constitutionally be governed by the law of several states. There are also cases,
and issues in cases, that are so close to one state and far from another that the Constitution is interpreted to permit one law to govern
while excluding the other.
Since the full faith and credit clause obviously provides no textual detail, and since the Congress has chosen not to do so, the Supreme Court is left with the task of providing a rational system of
constitutional limitations.3 9 To the extent possible, such a system
should be simple, appeal to informed intuition, and do minimum vio32. C.

CRAMTON,

D.

CURRIE

& H.

KAY, CONFLICT OF LAWS

435 (3d ed. 1981).

33. Redish, supra note 8, at 1126-29.
34. Martin, supra note 7, at 192; Martin, supra note 31, at 152-53.
35. The limits on a state's power to tax under the due process clause do not involve
federalism. Redish, supra note 8, at 1129.

36. Id. at 1122.
37.

Professor Crosskey argued that that was the original intent of the drafters. See W.
supra note 5, at 553-55.
R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, § 55, at 105.

CROSSKEY,

38.

39. The constitutional text leaves it open to Congress to proscribe such rules, but Congress has never done so. Crosskey argued that the framers intended that the common law of

private international law would control pending congressional action. W. CROSSKEY, supra
note 5, at 547-50. Even if such a general limitation is recognized, however, it is clear that
there is no longer a single prevailing "private international law" or body of conflicts law. See
R. LEFLAR, supra note 1, §§ 8, at 12.
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lence to established case law. The case law of the Supreme Court,
specifically dealing with constitutional limitations, and the case law
of the lower courts, applying various choice-of-law theories without
ever feeling any reason to doubt their constitutionality,40 should be
treated deferentially.
Professor Lea Brilmayer has introduced an as yet incomplete
test for legislative jurisdiction that seems to satisfy the goals set out
above.' 1 So far her approach is more effective at identifying what
lies beyond the permissible rather than what lies within it. Her
approach starts with a division of a state's policies into domestic policies and multistate policies, where "multistate policies are those that
refer to state lines.' 2 A contact, in order to give rise to a legitimate
interest, which would justify application of forum law, must be a
person, event, or item of property that domestic policy is intended to
regulate.' 3 The most straightforward demonstration that a particular
contact is one intended to be regulated by state law is that the contact is a formal requirement of a cause of action based upon the
regulation. Thus, the occurrence of an accident within a state gives it
a legitimate interest in applying its own law to a claim based upon
the accident, but "[p]resumably the fact that Lavinia Hague's lawyer was licensed to practice in Minnesota would not create a Minne4
sota interest, even if her lawyer was working for a contingent fee."' 4
Contacts need not be part of the formal requirement of the
cause of action, however, in order to qualify. Some rules are
designed to regulate certain conduct but are not stated in terms of
that conduct. Professor Brilmayer's example is a rule refusing enforcement to consumer-warranty disclaimers. The rule may have
been based upon a fear of merchant overreaching, but the difficulty
of proving overreaching may have led to a rule making no explicit
reference to it. If so, the occurrence of the overreaching in the forum
would justify the application of forum law.
One of the most appealing parts of Brilmayer's approach is its
simple, straightforward justification: The state, in applying its own
law under the circumstances described above, behaves normally by
40. See, e.g., Aldens, Inc. v. Packel, 524 F.2d 38 (3d Cir. 1975), ceit. denied sub nom.
Aldens, Inc. v. Kane, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal. 2d 551, 432 P.2d 727, 63

Cal. Rptr. 31 (1967).
41. Brilmayer, Legitimate Interests in Multistate Problems: As Between State and
Federal Law, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1315 (1981).

42. Id. at 1326.
43. Id. at 1329.
44. Id. at 1329-30.
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regulating the normal objects of its regulatory efforts.45 Because a
conflicts case necessarily contains circumstances related to other
states, the forum is necessarily regulating events that are within the
jurisdiction of another state. But since by hypothesis the case has
multistate elements, that effect is inevitable; and it is justified because such regulation is incidental to regulating events within its
normal and accepted jurisdiction.
In her article, Professor Brilmayer restricted herself to the
application of this test to one of the three contacts identified in
Hague-the decedent's employment in Minnesota.' Obviously, the
decedent's employment was not a formal element of the cause of action in Hague, but her approach requires her to ask further whether
employment bears "informal policy relevance" to the stacking question in the manner that overreaching bears to the issue of warranty
disclaimers. 47 Professor Brilmayer's approach offers hope for a rational approach to the problem of legislative jurisdiction. Along this
line I suggest modifications, extend them to the other two contacts in
Hague-Lavinia Hague's after-acquired domicile and the conduct of
extensive but unrelated business in Minnesota by the defendant-and explore their application in a few other areas. I do so, of
course, on my own: Professor Brilmayer may not see my efforts as
the logical extension of her work.
Mrs. Hague's after-acquired residence itself is not a contact in
the Brilmayer sense-it is she, as a person, who constitutes the contact, since a contact is "a circumstance-a person, event, or item of
property-that connects the controversy with one of the involved
states."'48 Her residence, however, is what connects her with Minnesota. Since a contact does not justify the application of forum law
unless it bears a formal substantive relevance or informal policy relevance to the state's regulatory effort, it is necessary to analyze Mrs.
Hague's relevance to Minnesota's regulatory effort. The Minnesota
courts in Hague faced the stacking issue.49 The regulatory effort has
to do with the amount of insurance proceeds recoverable from a
45. See id. at 1317.
46. Id. at 1341.
47. Although the question could probably have been answered without extensive research, Professor Brilmayer researched the question carefully and concluded that employment

was unrelated to the stacking issue in this way. See id. at 1344.
48.
49.
1979).

Id. at 1329.
Hague v. Allstate Ins. Co., 289 N.W.2d 43, aff'd on rehearing,id.at 50 (Minn.
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given accident under multiple policies. 0 It therefore formally involves directly only the plaintiff insured and the beneficiary of the
insurance contracts. The beneficiary was the estate of the decedent,
of which Mrs. Hague was the representative.51 Clearly her move to
Minnesota, however, was not a move as a representative of the estate, nor did the estate itself in any sense move. In fact, the estate
was itself simply a representative of Mr. Hague's interests. Thus it
would be his connection to Minnesota through his employment, and
not hers, that would provide possible formal substantive relevance.52
It follows that Mrs. Hague's domicile, whenever acquired, has no
formal substantive relevance to Minnesota's regulatory efforts.
The informal policy relevance of her domicile is harder to
gauge. It is undoubtedly true that a significant number of automobile accidents involving insurance result in death for one of the beneficiaries. It is thus reasonable to conclude that Minnesota's regulation of the stacking issue was designed to benefit not only the
insured, but also the beneficiaries of the formal insured-surviving
spouses in particular. On that basis, Mrs. Hague's after-acquired
domicile might justify application of Minnesota law.
Allstate's doing unrelated business in Minnesota leads to a similar conclusion: As defendant, its contact bears formal relevance to
the state's regulatory efforts.
It should be emphasized that under Professor Brilmayer's approach, the formal substantive relevance or informal policy relevance
of a contact is not alone sufficient to justify application of forum law;
one or the other is simply a necessary condition. Thus, these two
conclusions do not necessarily lead, under her theory, to upholding
the result in Hague.
As one who would like to see greater predictive power from this
appealing theory, and as one who intuitively recoils from the result
in Hague, I suggest two modifications of Professor Brilmayer's
theory:
1).A contact is an event that takes place within the forum or an
item of property located there that connects the controversy with
one of the involved states.
2) A state may apply its own law to an issue in a case if at least
dne contact bears formal substantive relevance or informal policy
50. Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449
51. Id.
52.

U.S. at

305-06.

Professor Brilmayer considers and disposes of the employment relationship. See

Brilmayer, supra note 41, at 1343-44.
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relevance to the state's regulatory effort, but not otherwise.
Two things should be noted about this proposed modification: First,
it eliminates "persons" as contacts; second, it makes the connection
stated in the second rule not only necessary but sufficient. The
reader familiar with the cases will recognize that one of the chief
motivations for such a modification is to obtain a rule of higher predictive power which is nonetheless consistent with the bedrock of legislative jurisdiction, Home Insurance Co. v. Dick.53 There is little
dissent5 4 from a central principle of that case-that the domicile of
one of the parties does not by itself justify the imposition of forum
law, except, perhaps, in cases involving status. 55
This tinkering may appear ad hoc. Why should people, in whose
favor laws are made, not be "contacts" of the most important type?
The answer lies, I believe, in the first part of this essay: If the only
consideration were the relationship between the forum and the individuals, the desire of the forum to protect one of its own domiciliaries would be more than enough justification for applying its own
law. 56 But if the problem is perceived chiefly as a reasonable distribution of legislative power among sovereigns, accepting domicile as a
basis for asserting legislative jurisdiction goes too far, since it is a
rare conflicts case in which none of the parties is a domiciliary of the
forum. It is, however, a reasonable limitation to assert that states
may legitimately protect their domiciliaries and others with relation
to in-state events. Thus, modification of Professor Brilmayer's test to
exclude "persons" as contacts seems reasonable.
On this basis it is clear that the two nonemployment "contacts"
in Hague would be insufficient to justify application of Minnesota
law. Professor Brilmayer has already demonstrated that the employment contact is insufficient. 57 Unless contacts that by themselves are
insufficient may cumulate into significance, as the Hague plurality
believed, it follows that Hague was wrongly decided. Is there any
place in an appropriate theory for allowing such cumulation? It is
certainly logically possible to have a consistent theory in which contacts individually insufficient may cumulate, but from a practical
standpoint it is highly undesirable. The attractiveness of Professor
53.
54.

281 U.S. 397 (1930).
Professor Ehrenzweig, however, expressed doubt. See A.

INTERNATIONAL LAW

55.
56.
57.

EHRENZWEIG, PRIVATE

35 (1972).

281 U.S. at 408.
See notes 8-16 supra and accompanying text.
Brilmayer, supra note 41, at 1343-47.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1981

11

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 1 [1981], Art. 6
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 10:133

Brilmayer's theory lies in the combination of its plausibility and its
concreteness. Although one could hardly accuse it of being a cookbook recipe, it is certainly a more workable theory-providing more
guidance to lower courts, for example-than such generalized tests
as "fair play and substantial justice" or "minimum contacts." Adding a wrinkle to the effect that the insufficient may accumulate into
the sufficient requires subsidiary rules to answer the simple question:
When will they accumulate, and when will they not? It is precisely
the question that the Hague plurality answered with deafening
silence.5 8
At least two troublesome points remain, if a theory of the type
proposed by Professor Brilmayer can be worked out. First, the theory
as stated in modified form above seems to outlaw the result in Babcock v. Jackson.59 In Babcock two New Yorkers were involved in an
Ontario accident. Under the Ontario guest statute, no recovery was
possible. Under New York common law it was, and the New York
Court of Appeals chose to apply New York law. 60 To all but the
archdefender of vested rights, the result is at least constitutional, if
not also desirable. If an insurance motive behind the New York common law can be perceived, there is no difficulty with the constitutionality of the result under the modified Brilmayer approach since the
insurance is so obviously connected with a New York insured and an
insurance company that was doing business in New York when it
issued the policy. But what if insurance had not been involved, and
the simple disagreement between New York and Ontario was what
was fair? In other words, what if Ontario felt that one who accepted
a gratuitous ride should not sue while New York felt otherwise?
Then insurance would have no formal or informal relevance to the
regulatory effort of New York, and New York therefore would have
no constitutional basis for applying its own law. This is only one example of the general problem of the case in which two domiciliaries
of the same state perform an act or acts in a second state, but where
we are willing to say that the domicile of the parties, rather than the
58. The plurality's only reference to the cumulative effect of the contacts it discussed
comes at the end of the opinion where it says: "In sum, Minnesota had a significant aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creating state interests, such that application of its law was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." 449 U.S. at 320 (footnote
omitted). In the footnote the plurality states that it expresses no view on whether two of the
three contacts-decedent's employment in the forum state and defendant's business presence
in the forum state-would have been enough. Id. n.29.
59. 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963).
60. Id. at 484, 191 N.E.2d at 285, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 751-52.
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place of their acting, is the more significant "contact." Thus, I would
modify the rules accordingly:
1) A contact is an event that takes place within the forum or an
item of property located there that connects the controversy with
one of the involved states.
2) A state may apply its own law to an issue in a case if at least
one contact bears formal substantive relevance or informal policy
relevance to the state's regulatory effort or satisfies rule 3, but not
otherwise.

3) A state may apply its own law to an issue in a case if the person
disadvantaged by it is a domiciliary of the forum and such an application does not unduly interfere with the sovereignty of another
connected jurisdiction.
Again there may seem to be an ad hoc quality to the modification unless one reflects on the underlying source of limitation on legislative jurisdiction: federalism. The starting point for the original
test was not the question whether a state might have some reasonable basis for regulating a dispute, but whether, in light of the dispute's connection with other jurisdictions, it should be allowed to do
so. When the only claim for regulation was the domicile of one of
the parties, reasonable federalism would not permit the assertion of
legislative jurisdiction. But when a state acts to apply its own law to
the disadvantage of one of its own domiciliaries, it is unlikely to be
interfering with any but the altruistic interests of another state. Of
course, a state otherwise unconnected with the case may not be inclined to apply its unfavorable law against one of its own domiciliaries unless to do so will benefit another domiciliary. Thus, the state's
motive may be the domicile of the party benefiting from the application of its law, but its constitutional justification is the domicile of
the party disadvantaged by it.
The final "fudge factor," limiting rule 3 when "such application
does not unduly interfere with the sovereignty of another connected
jurisdiction," is designed to accommodate a situation in which state
A may have a paramount interest in protecting a domiciliary of state
B. For example, assume that state A has a good samaritan statute
and that a doctor from state B renders service at the site of an accident in state A in a manner that is negligent but not grossly negligent. It would be inappropriate to apply the ordinary-negligence
standard of state B against the defendant based upon his domicile in
state B, because to do so might frustrate an important policy of state
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Rule 3 should not be read as justifying the result in Hague,
even if one neglects to notice that one of the parties acquired Minnesota domicile after the relevant facts of the case. Rule 3 is inapplicable to Hague because it is inappropriate to equate the domicile of a
natural person to the "presence" of a corporation based upon its substantial business within a state: A natural person has only one domicile, while a corporation may be doing substantial business in many
states. Thus, while applying unfavorable forum law against an individual based upon his domicile means that no more than the altruistic interests of other states might be infringed,61 applying unfavorable forum law on no basis other than substantial business within the
forum will automatically impose a burden inconsistent with the policies of other states (such as that of incorporation or of chief place of
business) with a substantial interest in the well-being of the
corporation.
A second troublesome point, which I am not now prepared to
pursue in detail, is the question of status. For example, it is clear
that under American law a state that is the domicile of one party to
a marriage may assert both legislative and judicial jurisdiction on
the basis of that domicile alone.6 2 This is true regardless of what
"events" have taken place within the forum. Without elaborating the
details of a theory that is both consistent and broad enough to incorporate questions of status, one can observe that underlying principles
of federalism remain the same while the occasions for applying them
are different. Allowing the assertion of legislative jurisdiction on the
basis of domicile goes too far, while limiting the basis for legislative
jurisdiction to events seems a natural approach. That approach may
work for cases that arise out of factors that may be localized in time
-

"events" -

but it does not work for status precisely because sta-

tus is a legal description of a phenomenon that is continuing rather
than localized in time. Also, most questions of status involve issues
of intense state concern (such as marital status) where it is not clear
that the rules provided for areas of lesser concern may be transplanted wholesale. Finally, most issues of status are ones as to which
there is almost universal concern for certainty and uniformity-goals
that may be promoted by the present domicile-oriented approach.
It is not clear whether Professor Brilmayer's efforts, or my suggestions concerning them, have any chance for consideration. In
61. Except as noted in the discussion of the good samaritan hypothetical above.
62. Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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other words, does Hague foreclose the analysis suggested here?
Hague, of course, has no majority opinion. The plurality's opinion is
the least analytical of the three. Yet, because it has so little to say
about doctrine, it may not shackle future decisions as much as many
had initially feared. Justice Stevens' one-man opinion gives some
reason for hope that a principled theory will yet emerge. His division
of the question into due process and full faith and credit components
has a firm basis in the cases. 63 His emphasis upon undue interference
with the sovereignty of other states under the full faith and credit
test"4 is encouraging. My only point of disagreement is his apparent
unwillingness to find undue interference in most ordinary cases. I
would find such interference more often, keeping in mind that sovereignty is interfered with not only when the direct economic interests
of the states are involved, but also when one of their primary functions-the regulation of private disputes-is interfered with.
I am also hopeful that the due process side of his analysis will
eventually be seen as somewhat overemphasized. He gives three examples of due process violations when a forum has chosen its own
substantive law: "if that rule favored residents over nonresidents, if it
represented a dramatic departure from the rule that obtains in most
American jurisdictions, or if the rule itself was unfair on its face or
as applied. 65 Two of these Justice Stevens himself acknowledged as
at least "suspect" even without any due process theory of legislative
jurisdiction,"6 the first because of the equal protection and privileges
and immunities clauses, and the third because of ordinary substantive or procedural due process. The second-the unusualness of the
forum's rule-is more problematical if it is meant to suggest a lower
status for departures from the norm simply because they are departures. If it is meant simply to tag situations in which the potential
for unfair surprise is greatest, it is consistent with the analysis made
above.
No matter what rules eventually emerge, the legal community
has the right to ask of the Court a case with a majority opinion, 67 a
63. 449 U.S. at 321 n.4 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
64.

Id. at 322-23 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).

65. Id. at 327 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
66. Id. at 327 n.15 (Stevens, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
67.

Upon finding that it had no majority, would not it have been simpler and less confus-

ing to lawyers, lower courts, and the rest of us, simply to dismiss the writ of certiorari as
improvidently granted? After all, the presumed purpose of granting certiorari in such cases is

to clarify the law, and whatever else Hague did, without a majority opinion it did not clarify.
(Confusing things further, the original published unofficial version of the dissent referred to
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majority opinion with clearer rules, and perhaps even a case that
does not involve an insurance company, so that we can see the rules
operating in a context with fewer special considerations.68 The grim
alternative is the need for yet more symposiums.

the plurality opinion constantly as the "majority." See 101 S.Ct. 633, 650.)
68. The only cases in the last thirty years or so to consider these problems have been
insurance cases. Traditionally insurance companies get the short end of the stick when it
comes to doubtful cases, quite simply because of a pervasive tendency to spread the risk of loss
as widely as possible. Moreover, a majority of insurance companies likely to be involved in
major litigation (and to have the resources to carry matters to the Supreme Court) are insurance companies with nationwide business. Such were the insurance companies in Watson v.
Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954), Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, Ltd., 377 U.S.
179 (1964), and Hague. It invites a distortion of the law in this area constantly to choose cases
involving litigants least likely to excite our sympathies. Even though the Court often emphasizes the foreseeability that can be attributed to an insurance company, and in Hague emphasizes that the defendant was doing business in the forum, even though there is recognition of
factors that may tend to make the insurance companies atypical, the Court's choice of cases,
along with their results, has created an atmosphere of "anything goes" in choice of law.
There are hard choice-of-law cases that do not involve insurance. See, e.g., McCluney v.
Schlitz Brewing Co., 649 F.2d 578 (8th Cir.), aff'd, 50 U.S.L.W. 3445 (U.S. Dec. 1, 1981). In
McCluney, the Eighth Circuit held that due process prevents the application of a Missouri
statute requiring employers, upon request, to provide discharged employees with a statement of
reasons for discharge where the employee was hired in Missouri but promoted and transferred
to other states over a period of years. The Supreme Court affirmed without even a per curiam
opinion, even though there was a dissenting opinion at the court of appeals level and the Court
itself had provided no majority opinion in Hague.
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